Anticipating the outrage and feelings of insult of some believers, let me foreclose (again) that I consider myself as a pragmatic relativist. My pondering in all kind of religions, philosophies and theories led me to the conclusion that simply nothing is true or false, right or wrong. There’s simply no (objective) reality out there to base any (universal) truth on. Thus, I’m no disciple of science, either. Heck, I consider science just as much of a belief than religions for example: It’s basic axioms in methods and theorems in theories are arbitrary presumptions – premises. However, this is where pragmatism comes in: Science has provided the most comprehensive and compelling concept for explaining this our world (in the West) so far, calmed down people’s worries and doubts and thus contributed the most to life’s highest values – may it be longevity, happiness or human progress (as I think is the basis for the prior).
I’m trying to understand every different concept for explaining the world. This attempt of course is limited and sometimes thwarted by my social imprint (which is of a Middle-European Protestant-Christian, rather Republican than liberal democratic kind). I see logical inconsistencies in the argumentation of people who on the one hand affirm the subjectivity of our consciousness and the important role of the human subconscious and on the other hand, claim to have got conscious of all their social imprints and to be able to transcend them. Such transcendence would not only require full objectivity but also full awareness of the subconscious. This is logically contradictory, I reckon. But again, such people may immunize their opinions by claiming that they have also transcended logic – which I must admit haven’t managed myself nor observed among great philosophers, animals or nature in general: Trial and error, learning by doing – life is doomed to be logic, it seems. Thus, such people rather appear like heretics in my eyes and out of different presumptions alone, must be excluded out of this discussion.
And nevertheless or just in fact, it’s such logical contradiction and the subsequent lack of credibility among certain alternative concepts of beliefs to science that I want to discuss at this point. Recently, a huge variety of rather new concepts of beliefs have come to my attention that try to merge spiritual ideas with scientific findings. The term “spiritual ideas” may not have explanatory sufficiency (as in the sense of mathematical sufficiency), but seems to hit the spot as the basic difference between such concepts of beliefs and science is that it assumes “non-materialistic”, thus spiritual factors in the universe that play a role in our life. Again, it’s important to notice that such beliefs do not assume that this might be materialistic aspects that just haven’t been discovered or proven by science, yet, but presume (and thus immunize the discussion) that this cannot be researched by scientific methods. “Only through your spirit you can explain consciousness”, I was told. Well, this reminded me of semantic linguistics where my friend told me that you cannot really explain scientifically the coordination between words and their empirical referents. Another common example is that there’s no way to explain with science why human beings have consciousness. On my behalf, however, this question is flawed because again, we analyze our consciousness from a subjective point, raise it over living being’s state of being and think that we’ve reached the peak of evolution. How the heck should we really know what we are, what we are thinking when our subconscious is so overwhelming? I rather favour the cyberpunkish conception that consciousness and identity is the result of an overflow of information that cannot be processed in time. In such a view, consciousness is not digital – existent or inexistent – but analog-dynamic: You can have more or less. On a sidenote, I don’t see any other motive in the general dichotomic conception of human beings on the one side and the rest of the nature of the other side than the “eternal” struggle of the human ego to be special. Dodge this!
So, we’re talking about concepts of beliefs that draw most of their ideas from spiritual and religious beliefs like Buddhism, Hinduism, Jainism (Heck, most of those people don’t even know the source of both Buddhism and Hinduism!), Daoism, Shintoism, etc. General characteristics of these beliefs are that they exclude (monotheistic) deistic entities, stress on the human spirit and other polypolistic forces in nature. This renders the explanatory content rather flexible or differently put, ambiguous and vague.
I don’t see any logical inconsistency in those views. They’re perfectly fine in regard of their intrinsic premises, the argumentation and conclusions.
However, the bogus comes in when disciples (especially Western people) try to merge these ideas with science. By trying to fathom the limits of scientific explanatory power, in the present case, quantum physics, they try to build a bridge to spiritual concepts: Waves are no immaterial, thus spiritual. The logic is incredibly flawed. Why? Because science is built on materialistic premises! You cannot connect to line of argumentations that are built on different presumptions! Further, empiric science itself consciously excludes itself out of the whole wave and string theories because experiments have already proven that the very act of empirical analysis influences the object of investigation. (Personally, I also see that case in social sciences where descriptive and especially instrumental theories turn normative as their explanatory power influences the empirical referent more than the other way round. Jensen’s free cashflow theory might be a famous example. Personally, I’m studying on the case of corporate governance in Japan in general.) Thus, such disciples simply abuse the huge comprehensive and consistent body of findings, arguments and conclusions by science in order to prove their own ideas right – even though you cannot prove but only confirm or falsify theories of a humanistic approach!
But, why the heck would they want to merge those ideas with science anyway? There’s only one simple answer: They cannot belief them without having approved their own (socially imprinted) beliefs of Western science and norms! In other words, they’re still (unconsciously) trapped in their old beliefs – and haven’t even got aware of that! Thus, they do not only implicitly confirm their old Western beliefs but also betray their new-claimed spiritual ideas, deprive their credibility and create an illogical bastard of esotericism. That’s what esotericism is anyway.
Instead, those disciples should keep their hands of scientific findings and turning them into scientistic arguments, but instead should stick to their completely distinct premises. And if they want to proselytize – either because they need confirmation in their own beliefs by convincing others or because they want to make profit out of it – they shall argue the only valid way: with pragmatism. They shall foreclose – just as I did – that their ideas are also mere beliefs, not to be proven (scientifically), but to be believed, and argue that then– and only then – they would fulfill those aforementioned highest values even better than science does.
Showing posts with label argumentation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label argumentation. Show all posts
Wednesday, 27 May 2009
Monday, 13 April 2009
Eine These zur Problematik des wissenschaftlichen Geltungsanspruchs
Die grossartige Grundidee der Wissenschaften (gerade wegen ihrer historischen Ursprüngen in den Naturwissenschaften) ist es, dass im Gegensatz zu anderen Weltbildern, namentlich Religionen, keine konkreten Grundprinzipien für die Anschauungen, sprich die Theorien, existieren sollten, sondern nur Prinzipien, Grundsätze, in der Methodik, also, wie man die Welt anschaut.
Es ist auch diese Grundidee, auf der die empirischen Sozialwissenschaften und ihre deskripitven und instrumentellen Theorien fussen: Man behauptet nichts, was man nicht vorher gesehen hat.
Nun gilt es jedoch - wiederum aus historischer Sicht - zu befinden, dass die meisten heute gängigen empirischen Untersuchungen und Theorien von westlichen (also im westlichen Kulturraum sozialisierten) Wissenschaftlern im westlichen Raum untersucht und zu solcher Konsistenz entwickelt worden sind, dass sie im Zeitpunkt der Ausdehnung und Vermittlung in andere Kulturräume, speziell den asiatischen, wenig aufnahme- und veränderungsbereit war. In der Folge sollte sich die Wissenschaft nicht mehr an den Tatsachen, sondern umgekehrt die Tatsachen an den Theorien orientieren.
Hierbei entblösste sich die Empirie als stark in den Theorien befangen, als teilweise "self-fulfilling prophecy", indem sie den Untersuchungsgegenstand, asiatische Kulturen oder Wirtschaftssysteme, durch ihre eigene Untersuchung und mit dem übermächtigen ökonomischen, politischen und sozialen Apparat des Westens im Rücken selbst veränderte. Es ist dies, was Kritiker an westlichen Wissenschaften als "moderner Imperialismus" diffamieren.
An dieser Stelle soll nicht von einem (beabsichtigten) Imperialismus der Wissenschaften gesprochen werden, sondern von einem Paradigma: Die westlichen Theorien sind zu raffiniert geworden, als dass sie allzu andersartige Tatsachen integrieren könnten. Dies muss oder kann sie auch fast nicht mehr, da mit der Globalisierung schon in vielen Bereichen eine "Verwestlichung" - gerade auch im Zuge der wissenschaftlichen Erforschung - stattgefunden hat. Damit hat sich die Wissenschaft aber selbst unbeabsichtigt auch den Anspruch einer höheren Geltungskraft als andere Glaubensmuster, etwa auch die Religionen, abgesprochen.
Umgekehrt lässt sich diese Argumentation aufgrund des nachhaltigen Einflusses der westlichen Wissenschaften auf die verbliebenen andersartigen Referenzpunkte nicht beweisen. Sie erhebt aber auch keinen höheren Geltungsanspruch wie die Wissenschaft und will sich selbst immunisieren, sondern will als These verbleiben.
Es ist auch diese Grundidee, auf der die empirischen Sozialwissenschaften und ihre deskripitven und instrumentellen Theorien fussen: Man behauptet nichts, was man nicht vorher gesehen hat.
Nun gilt es jedoch - wiederum aus historischer Sicht - zu befinden, dass die meisten heute gängigen empirischen Untersuchungen und Theorien von westlichen (also im westlichen Kulturraum sozialisierten) Wissenschaftlern im westlichen Raum untersucht und zu solcher Konsistenz entwickelt worden sind, dass sie im Zeitpunkt der Ausdehnung und Vermittlung in andere Kulturräume, speziell den asiatischen, wenig aufnahme- und veränderungsbereit war. In der Folge sollte sich die Wissenschaft nicht mehr an den Tatsachen, sondern umgekehrt die Tatsachen an den Theorien orientieren.
Hierbei entblösste sich die Empirie als stark in den Theorien befangen, als teilweise "self-fulfilling prophecy", indem sie den Untersuchungsgegenstand, asiatische Kulturen oder Wirtschaftssysteme, durch ihre eigene Untersuchung und mit dem übermächtigen ökonomischen, politischen und sozialen Apparat des Westens im Rücken selbst veränderte. Es ist dies, was Kritiker an westlichen Wissenschaften als "moderner Imperialismus" diffamieren.
An dieser Stelle soll nicht von einem (beabsichtigten) Imperialismus der Wissenschaften gesprochen werden, sondern von einem Paradigma: Die westlichen Theorien sind zu raffiniert geworden, als dass sie allzu andersartige Tatsachen integrieren könnten. Dies muss oder kann sie auch fast nicht mehr, da mit der Globalisierung schon in vielen Bereichen eine "Verwestlichung" - gerade auch im Zuge der wissenschaftlichen Erforschung - stattgefunden hat. Damit hat sich die Wissenschaft aber selbst unbeabsichtigt auch den Anspruch einer höheren Geltungskraft als andere Glaubensmuster, etwa auch die Religionen, abgesprochen.
Umgekehrt lässt sich diese Argumentation aufgrund des nachhaltigen Einflusses der westlichen Wissenschaften auf die verbliebenen andersartigen Referenzpunkte nicht beweisen. Sie erhebt aber auch keinen höheren Geltungsanspruch wie die Wissenschaft und will sich selbst immunisieren, sondern will als These verbleiben.
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Thursday, 19 March 2009
Gender-specific conception of attention
There appears to be a rather striking difference in the conception of "attention" between genders. In fact, I daresay that the female understanding of "attention" is, once again, fallacious. My argument is persuasive as it's developed system-intrinsically, in other words, I thought it through by emphatising women in particular situations which men are confronted with way too often: bitching.
First things first however: What is attention? The term involves two different sub-concepts, I reckon. On the one hand, there's natural attention for things that appear interesting to us. Therefore, it's interest that steers our attention. Such kind of attention can be lost again, though. Things aren't interesting all the time. On the other hand, there's the normative attention, that kind of attention we're required to pay - for safety and security. Women tend to mix up these two ideas. Or let's simply ask: What makes a woman gain the attention of a man? There might be a slight chance - or rather a first, small significance - for looks. Generally and to the most extent, however, it's rather about the stuff he's doing and the thing he's talking about. This is the reason why the concept of status and prestige goes so perfectly along with the amount and extent of women a man can get: Women are attentive for achievements and skills. Of course, such status and prestige isn't constant. Men aren't interesting all the time and therefore lose attention again. The male gender is used to have learn this bitter lesson for millenia already.
When women come to themselves, however, they suddenly apply completely different standards: It's not about what they do and say, but how they appear. In short, it's all about appeareance, not what you are, but how you have been created. Anyway, this goes still perfectly along with the concept. Looks aren't permanent, either. Even the most beautiful girl doesn't only get old, but boring to look at much quicker than she ages. Everyone gets fuckin' bored about a picasso after watching it for some time - and even Picasso got fuckin' bored of his perfect paintings he drew in early years.
However, due to the fact that female attention isn't gained by achievements and skills, they never had to do much for it and end up thinking of it as a state of being! That's the first big fallacy! They think that they're simple existence is cause for attention. And whenever a man loses interest in a woman's appearance, she feel rejected and without any attention. Not leaving to that, they step further and mix up the two concepts of attention and further allege men of being careless! That's the second big fallacy. That the whole case isn't about this second type of attention, anyway, shows the very reaction of the woman herself: In fact, her allegations are nothing else but a final, ignorant and desperate approach to raise attention: bitching. There might be the general tendency that the more attention a woman can gain with her appereance the more ignorant she is to the whole process and the less alternatives she has to "deliver" than the oh so natural bitching.
Of course, bitching itself is the most illogical, retarded act of communication known to man. Basically, it's a woman searching for every slightest option and reason to make allegations to her man. Hell, they might start digging up your whole past 'cause that's the only thing they could come up with. Don't ask them what their point is about. They first have to stop talking to realize that they're only doing it to gain attention - which apparently doesn't work and therefore wouldn't have started in the first place. Self-reflection, my dear friends, cannot be forced upon.
However, modern technologies seem to have given a very powerful tool to men and their suffering: To the extent that women have to write down their bitching and that stuff actually get protocolled, they are confronted with their loose, illogical babble first when they are actually writing it down, second when the man has the opportunity to answer and point out the fallacies in the argumentation without being interrupted all the time and third, when checking the protocolls. Oh, how I am looking forward to the day of complete state control when I can ask the woman to look up "conversation protocoll, file 4.21, day 19.03.2009" to see that I've already admitted, asserted and analyzed a certain mistake of mine - or that it wasn't my mistake in the first place. Efficiency in partner conversation appears to have a very bright future.
Back to the concept of attention. In short, there aren't only different types of attention, different ways genders cause it, but in woman's case, they apply different types of standards to attention: While men naturally get and deserve it only when they deliver, they claim it for themselves as some state of being.
First things first however: What is attention? The term involves two different sub-concepts, I reckon. On the one hand, there's natural attention for things that appear interesting to us. Therefore, it's interest that steers our attention. Such kind of attention can be lost again, though. Things aren't interesting all the time. On the other hand, there's the normative attention, that kind of attention we're required to pay - for safety and security. Women tend to mix up these two ideas. Or let's simply ask: What makes a woman gain the attention of a man? There might be a slight chance - or rather a first, small significance - for looks. Generally and to the most extent, however, it's rather about the stuff he's doing and the thing he's talking about. This is the reason why the concept of status and prestige goes so perfectly along with the amount and extent of women a man can get: Women are attentive for achievements and skills. Of course, such status and prestige isn't constant. Men aren't interesting all the time and therefore lose attention again. The male gender is used to have learn this bitter lesson for millenia already.
When women come to themselves, however, they suddenly apply completely different standards: It's not about what they do and say, but how they appear. In short, it's all about appeareance, not what you are, but how you have been created. Anyway, this goes still perfectly along with the concept. Looks aren't permanent, either. Even the most beautiful girl doesn't only get old, but boring to look at much quicker than she ages. Everyone gets fuckin' bored about a picasso after watching it for some time - and even Picasso got fuckin' bored of his perfect paintings he drew in early years.
However, due to the fact that female attention isn't gained by achievements and skills, they never had to do much for it and end up thinking of it as a state of being! That's the first big fallacy! They think that they're simple existence is cause for attention. And whenever a man loses interest in a woman's appearance, she feel rejected and without any attention. Not leaving to that, they step further and mix up the two concepts of attention and further allege men of being careless! That's the second big fallacy. That the whole case isn't about this second type of attention, anyway, shows the very reaction of the woman herself: In fact, her allegations are nothing else but a final, ignorant and desperate approach to raise attention: bitching. There might be the general tendency that the more attention a woman can gain with her appereance the more ignorant she is to the whole process and the less alternatives she has to "deliver" than the oh so natural bitching.
Of course, bitching itself is the most illogical, retarded act of communication known to man. Basically, it's a woman searching for every slightest option and reason to make allegations to her man. Hell, they might start digging up your whole past 'cause that's the only thing they could come up with. Don't ask them what their point is about. They first have to stop talking to realize that they're only doing it to gain attention - which apparently doesn't work and therefore wouldn't have started in the first place. Self-reflection, my dear friends, cannot be forced upon.
However, modern technologies seem to have given a very powerful tool to men and their suffering: To the extent that women have to write down their bitching and that stuff actually get protocolled, they are confronted with their loose, illogical babble first when they are actually writing it down, second when the man has the opportunity to answer and point out the fallacies in the argumentation without being interrupted all the time and third, when checking the protocolls. Oh, how I am looking forward to the day of complete state control when I can ask the woman to look up "conversation protocoll, file 4.21, day 19.03.2009" to see that I've already admitted, asserted and analyzed a certain mistake of mine - or that it wasn't my mistake in the first place. Efficiency in partner conversation appears to have a very bright future.
Back to the concept of attention. In short, there aren't only different types of attention, different ways genders cause it, but in woman's case, they apply different types of standards to attention: While men naturally get and deserve it only when they deliver, they claim it for themselves as some state of being.
Tuesday, 9 December 2008
A discrete approach to the systematization and interpretation of action incentives and its conception
It is said that people think differently – but it is also supposed that they all think in logical patterns, i.e. cascades of causal relations. The concept of logic is understood to be universal or at least, reconstructable in terms of intersubjectivity. (In this understanding, science is just another belief or concept, by the way.) Thus, despite different ways of thinking, they all can be understood by anyone.
I reckoned that the vast variety of arguments that explain and justify incentives for their decisions for actions can be categorized in three different types. The categorization is rought but allows to differentiate in three striking characteristics by showing inn the same time that despite these differences, the underlying argumentative pattern is yet the same.
The three different types are emotional-unconsciously rational, rational-egoistic and reasonable/ ideological arguments. The names are completely arbitrary, probably not sufficient and face a normative bias, too. Therefore, the concept of this differentiation shall not be considered by these names only.
The emotional-unconsciously rational kind of argument is both the most frequent
The second type of rational-egoistic arguments differs in exactly these two aspects. On the one hand, the creation of logically consistent causal arguments evolves in a conscious and deliberate way. On the other hand, the motivation for its creation is self-interested, thus conclusions of such reasoning are set against one’s own person under the consideration whether the outcome bears advantages or disadvantages.
As the motivation and incentive behind rational argumentation are personal merits, it can only change through supportive or affirmative input while contradicting or even disproving arguments will be either shut out or lead to the abandonment of the whole causal cascade. Thus, rational arguments have to be always and clearly consistent with self-interest and henceforth will be promoted among people with similar interests only. Towards other attitudes, rational arguments get replaced by reasonable ones. It has to be stressed out such reasonable arguments are not means by ends but mere instruments of replacement.
This leads us to the third type of reasonable arguments which is different from rational-egoistic arguments in their intersubjective reasoning. Causal cascades get built on motives and incentives that can be assumed or suggested among many, preferably all people, and their outcome redounds to a majority’s, preferably everybody’s advantage. Thus, such argumentation does not exclude personal interests but promotes them only if aligned with others. This way of reasoning is not only self-supportive but seeks commong agreement: In contrast to rational argumentation reasonable one does not reason at the expense of other interests but tries to consider all of them. Therefore, reasonable arguments are open to and can change through both affirming and disapproving input. Reasonable argumentation can not only be comprehended by different interest groups but also related to.
This aspect makes reasonable arguments highly sustainable and fit to public political discussions. [work in progress]
I reckoned that the vast variety of arguments that explain and justify incentives for their decisions for actions can be categorized in three different types. The categorization is rought but allows to differentiate in three striking characteristics by showing inn the same time that despite these differences, the underlying argumentative pattern is yet the same.
The three different types are emotional-unconsciously rational, rational-egoistic and reasonable/ ideological arguments. The names are completely arbitrary, probably not sufficient and face a normative bias, too. Therefore, the concept of this differentiation shall not be considered by these names only.
The emotional-unconsciously rational kind of argument is both the most frequent
The second type of rational-egoistic arguments differs in exactly these two aspects. On the one hand, the creation of logically consistent causal arguments evolves in a conscious and deliberate way. On the other hand, the motivation for its creation is self-interested, thus conclusions of such reasoning are set against one’s own person under the consideration whether the outcome bears advantages or disadvantages.
As the motivation and incentive behind rational argumentation are personal merits, it can only change through supportive or affirmative input while contradicting or even disproving arguments will be either shut out or lead to the abandonment of the whole causal cascade. Thus, rational arguments have to be always and clearly consistent with self-interest and henceforth will be promoted among people with similar interests only. Towards other attitudes, rational arguments get replaced by reasonable ones. It has to be stressed out such reasonable arguments are not means by ends but mere instruments of replacement.
This leads us to the third type of reasonable arguments which is different from rational-egoistic arguments in their intersubjective reasoning. Causal cascades get built on motives and incentives that can be assumed or suggested among many, preferably all people, and their outcome redounds to a majority’s, preferably everybody’s advantage. Thus, such argumentation does not exclude personal interests but promotes them only if aligned with others. This way of reasoning is not only self-supportive but seeks commong agreement: In contrast to rational argumentation reasonable one does not reason at the expense of other interests but tries to consider all of them. Therefore, reasonable arguments are open to and can change through both affirming and disapproving input. Reasonable argumentation can not only be comprehended by different interest groups but also related to.
This aspect makes reasonable arguments highly sustainable and fit to public political discussions. [work in progress]
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argument,
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egoistic,
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