A discrete approach to the systematization and interpretation of action incentives and its conception

It is said that people think differently – but it is also supposed that they all think in logical patterns, i.e. cascades of causal relations. The concept of logic is understood to be universal or at least, reconstructable in terms of intersubjectivity. (In this understanding, science is just another belief or concept, by the way.) Thus, despite different ways of thinking, they all can be understood by anyone.
I reckoned that the vast variety of arguments that explain and justify incentives for their decisions for actions can be categorized in three different types. The categorization is rought but allows to differentiate in three striking characteristics by showing inn the same time that despite these differences, the underlying argumentative pattern is yet the same.
The three different types are emotional-unconsciously rational, rational-egoistic and reasonable/ ideological arguments. The names are completely arbitrary, probably not sufficient and face a normative bias, too. Therefore, the concept of this differentiation shall not be considered by these names only.
The emotional-unconsciously rational kind of argument is both the most frequent

The second type of rational-egoistic arguments differs in exactly these two aspects. On the one hand, the creation of logically consistent causal arguments evolves in a conscious and deliberate way. On the other hand, the motivation for its creation is self-interested, thus conclusions of such reasoning are set against one’s own person under the consideration whether the outcome bears advantages or disadvantages.
As the motivation and incentive behind rational argumentation are personal merits, it can only change through supportive or affirmative input while contradicting or even disproving arguments will be either shut out or lead to the abandonment of the whole causal cascade. Thus, rational arguments have to be always and clearly consistent with self-interest and henceforth will be promoted among people with similar interests only. Towards other attitudes, rational arguments get replaced by reasonable ones. It has to be stressed out such reasonable arguments are not means by ends but mere instruments of replacement.
This leads us to the third type of reasonable arguments which is different from rational-egoistic arguments in their intersubjective reasoning. Causal cascades get built on motives and incentives that can be assumed or suggested among many, preferably all people, and their outcome redounds to a majority’s, preferably everybody’s advantage. Thus, such argumentation does not exclude personal interests but promotes them only if aligned with others. This way of reasoning is not only self-supportive but seeks commong agreement: In contrast to rational argumentation reasonable one does not reason at the expense of other interests but tries to consider all of them. Therefore, reasonable arguments are open to and can change through both affirming and disapproving input. Reasonable argumentation can not only be comprehended by different interest groups but also related to.
This aspect makes reasonable arguments highly sustainable and fit to public political discussions. [work in progress]