The perversion of the bonus system

Currently in Switzerland, there's a heated debate going about bonus payments in the destitute bank UBS. Basically, people argue whether good performing business segments and bankers should get their bonus granted even though the bank has sustained heavy financial loss in four terms in succession. On the one hand, many people who are positioned rather outside of the bank argue that bankers shouldn't get their bonuses paid with tax-funded provisions by the state - if there's no money, you cannot pay any premium. On the other hand, there are many people rather connected to the sector who point out that indeed, many business segments and bankers performed well in the last terms. However, their good results have been overshadowed by the incredible losses of others. They should be judged and promoted according to their own efforts and success.
Interestingly, a further voice has joined into this debate and is about to weaken the second position if though it's coming straight from within the banks: Especially on the vast non-executive levels, bonuses are decided and paid rather deliberately. The distribution of wage premiums is said to be intransparent and subjective. (see NZZ Online - "Völlig intransparent")
Within this whole debate, many people don't seem to realize the basic problem: That they've got different ideas about the concept of a bonus and that therefore, they are talking at cross-purposes. The first opinion is based on the idea that a bonus is a share of the company's profit. In this sense, beyond the basic compensation contract, a bonus system participates employees to the company's success. In fact, as this concept turns employees partially into shareholders, it's a further consequent step in the concepts of neo-liberalism and the new institutional economics. The second opinion is based on the assumption that a bonus is a reward for especially good work. In this sense, not the company itself but rather each employee's efforts and success are what the focus lies on. The company's success is understood as the sum of every employee's effort. And that's exactly where the fatal mistake of the second concept lies in and the third voice comes in.
A company is a black box. It's a boat where every employee sits in. As Coase had managed to explain in his ingenious essay of 1932, the very reason and origin of a company is the fulfillment of tasks which can barely rated and therefore traded in markets. There are companies because the evaluation and rating of labour on the market costs too much and causes too complex difficult which doesn't pay off in the end. In short, the transaction costs are too high. Isn't that exactly what the criticism about intransparency and deliberateness actually points out? It's not like the human resource management intends to rip off certain employees - of course not, as that would give completely wrong incentives and would rather harm the company's success in the long term. It's simply that they cannot do better.
If people want to secure themselves against the risks of the market, they join a company just like business segments are consolidated in one concern. But if they want to reap the profits and carry the losses of their own efforts, they go independent. There's a reason why there are independent brokers, dealers and fund managers in the financial landscape. Of course, there might be other reasons that force workers in a company - as economy of scales, lack of reputation, etc. However, with today's communication technologies and flexible working conditions, the aspect of risk management has become the biggest incentive to be employed. But if they want their risks covered, they also risk that they must cover up others in their team! That's the idea of teamwork. Sometimes, you're the winner, sometimes the loser. But always, you're sharing it with your teammates. So at that point, the idea of individual rewards and a consolidated business is simply a perversion of everything both the ingenious ideas of modern corporate governance and the understanding of traditional HRM concepts like clan culture has made us understand. Either, employees are the safest group of creditors on the balance sheet of a bank and get their constant interests covered first - as costs - or they are (at least) partially shareholders and profit from their team's success. Isn't one idea of the bonus system to increase shareholder value in the end? What do you think happens if some employees start shirking or gaining bonuses on costs of others? There are thousands of scenarios of moral hazard, adverse selection and transaction costs increases connected to the idea of individual reward.
So what's the conclusion? If a company faces losses, there won't be any money for bonuses. If some employees feel like they've got the short end of the stick, they must split off - maybe that would be a good reason to not abandon the idea of the separate banking system.